Mostra el registre parcial de l'element

dc.creator Ureña Martínez, Rubén
dc.date 2017-09-01T09:00:40Z
dc.date 2017-09-01T09:00:40Z
dc.date 2017-01
dc.date.accessioned 2024-12-16T10:25:08Z
dc.date.available 2024-12-16T10:25:08Z
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/2445/114878
dc.identifier.uri http://fima-docencia.ub.edu:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/18877
dc.description Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2017, Director: F. Javier Martínez de Albéniz
dc.description This degree project studies the main results on the bilateral assignment game. This is a part of cooperative game theory and models a market with indivisibilities and money. There are two sides of the market, let us say buyers and sellers, or workers and firms, such that when we match two agents from different sides, a profit is made. We show some good properties of the core of these games, such as its non-emptiness and its lattice structure. There are two outstanding points: the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation, in which all agents of one sector get their best possible outcome. We also study a related non-cooperative mechanism, an auction, to implement the buyers-optimal core allocation.
dc.format 57 p.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language eng
dc.rights cc-by-nc-nd (c) Rubén Ureña Martínez, 2017
dc.rights http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques
dc.subject Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject Treballs de fi de grau
dc.subject Jocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica)
dc.subject Optimització matemàtica
dc.subject Cooperative games (Mathematics)
dc.subject Bachelor's theses
dc.subject Noncooperative games (Mathematics)
dc.subject Mathematical optimization
dc.title An essay on assignment games
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis


Fitxers en aquest element

Fitxers Grandària Format Visualització

No hi ha fitxers associats a aquest element.

Aquest element apareix en la col·lecció o col·leccions següent(s)

Mostra el registre parcial de l'element

Cerca a DSpace


Cerca avançada

Visualitza

El meu compte